The local equity shareholding policy for ICT companies in Kenya require companies to have a minimum of 30% local shareholding. Balancing the pros and cons of Kenya’s 30% local shareholding policy for telecom companies, this blog post highlights the policy’s impact on economic growth and potential drawbacks while advocating for a balanced approach to foster a sustainable telecom industry.

By Gatuyu J

MOSES KURIA, the Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Trade, has publicly expressed disdain for local content requirements contained in Kenyan laws for various sectors. This culminates in a debate that has raged in recent years, where the Kenyan government has emphasized the need for local participation in the telecommunications sector by implementing policy declaration mandating that all telecom companies operating in the country have at least 30% local shareholding.

This policy has sparked a debate, with proponents and critics voicing their opinions on the potential impact of such a requirement. In this post, we will delve into the pros and cons of the local content equity shareholding requirement in Kenya’s telecom sector and explore whether it is the right approach to achieving sustainable growth in this crucial industry.

Proponents of the policy argue that local content equity shareholding fosters economic growth by enabling Kenyan nationals to participate in the lucrative telecom industry. By involving locals in the ownership and decision-making processes of the industry, the policy promotes wealth distribution and reduces income disparities, contributing to socio-economic development.

In a country where income inequality remains a pressing issue, the local content requirement may help alleviate some of these disparities by creating opportunities for Kenyan nationals to benefit from the profits generated by the telecom industry.

Another advantage of the policy is its ability to encourage local investment in the telecom sector, stimulating growth and job creation. By requiring a percentage of equity to be held by locals, the policy incentivizes Kenyan investors to put their money into the telecom sector. This increased local investment could lead to the expansion of existing telecom infrastructure and the creation of more jobs, ultimately resulting in an overall boost to the Kenyan economy.

Local ownership also has the potential to facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge from international partners to local investors. By working alongside experienced foreign companies, Kenyan investors can learn valuable industry insights, business practices, and technical know-how. This process builds a skilled workforce and promotes self-sufficiency in the sector, reducing reliance on foreign expertise and investment in the long run.

Moreover, ensuring that a substantial portion of the telecom sector is controlled by Kenyans helps safeguard national interests and reduces the influence of foreign entities on the country’s communication infrastructure. By retaining a significant share in the sector, the Kenyan government can better regulate and oversee the industry, ensuring that it operates in the best interests of the country and its citizens.

However, critics argue that the equity shareholding requirement may deter foreign investors, who might perceive the regulation as restrictive. Limiting the percentage of shares that foreign entities can hold could make Kenya’s telecom sector less attractive to international companies, which could, in turn, limit the entry of new players in the market. Reduced competition and the potential stifling of innovation may result from this decreased foreign investment, ultimately hindering the growth of the telecom industry.

Furthermore, the high capital costs associated with investing in the telecom sector might be prohibitive for many local investors. This could lead to a situation where only a select few Kenyans, possibly those with existing wealth or connections, are able to participate in the industry. This outcome would negate the intended benefits of the policy by concentrating ownership and wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals, exacerbating income inequality rather than reducing it.

The local equity shareholding policy may lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the optimal allocation of capital is based on the expected return and risk of the investment. By requiring companies to have a minimum of 30% local shareholding, the policy may force companies to allocate capital to local shareholders who may not have the expertise or resources to contribute to the growth and profitability of the company. This can result in suboptimal allocation of capital and lower returns for shareholders.

By prioritizing local ownership over expertise and competence, the policy could result in less skilled individuals gaining control of companies in the sector. This inefficient allocation of resources may lead to a less competitive industry, hinder growth, and even negatively impact the quality of services provided to consumers.

Additionally, the requirement for local equity shareholding could create opportunities for corruption and cronyism. With a limited pool of eligible investors, well-connected individuals may be granted preferential treatment or gain access to investment opportunities at the expense of genuine investors. This corruption could undermine the very goals the policy was designed to achieve, limiting the potential for broad-based economic growth and wealth distribution.

By requiring companies to have a minimum of 30% local shareholding, the policy may incentivize rent-seeking behavior among local shareholders who may seek to acquire shares solely for the purpose of acquiring economic rent, rather than contributing to the growth and profitability of the company.

Furthermore, the policy may inadvertently contribute to an increased regulatory burden on businesses operating in the telecom sector. Navigating the complexities of local content requirements and ensuring compliance with these regulations can be time-consuming and costly. This added burden could divert resources away from innovation and investment in infrastructure, ultimately hindering the growth and competitiveness of the industry.

In conclusion, while the local content equity shareholding requirement for telecom companies in Kenya has noble intentions, it is important to balance the potential benefits against the potential drawbacks. To truly promote local participation in the telecom sector, the government should consider other measures that facilitate investment, such as improving the business environment, providing financial incentives, and promoting education and training in the field of telecommunications.

Additionally, policymakers should explore the possibility of gradually increasing local content requirements over time, allowing the market to adjust and grow without causing undue strain on local investors or discouraging foreign investment.

By addressing these challenges, Kenya can create a telecom industry that fosters innovation, competition, and local ownership while attracting both domestic and foreign investment. A balanced approach to local content equity shareholding requirements, complemented by a comprehensive strategy to support the development of the industry, will be crucial in unlocking the full potential of Kenya’s telecom sector and ensuring sustainable growth in this vital industry.